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Abstract
As suggestions to modify the practice of the U.S. military justice system return to the fore
of American political discourse, the perennial proposal to divest commanders of authority to
convene courts-martial to adjudicate allegations of sexual assault is once again at the center of
the debate. While reformists are adamant that the suggested revision would support efforts to end
what has been characterized as an “epidemic of rape” in the U.S. military, the precise connection
between the “reform” and the desired improved outcomes remains tenuous. An assessment of
jurisdictions that have already divested commanders of such authority could provide persuasive
support to the reformist assertion that the United States could expect improved performance – if
the assessment reveals improved performance in other jurisdictions.
This essay conducts a comparative quantitative analysis of four jurisdictions – Australia,
the United Kingdom, Israel, and Canada – to determine whether vesting court-martial convening
authority in lawyers rather than commanders has resulted in improved performance in selected
criteria in relation to the issue of sexual assault in the military. The comparative quantitative
analysis conducted in this essay indicates that there is no correlative relationship between the
“reform” and the improved performance reformists hope to achieve, at least in the context of the
jurisdictions examined. This lack of a demonstrated correlative relationship in other jurisdictions
creates reason to doubt whether divesting commanders of the authority to convene courts-martial
to adjudicate allegations of sexual assault would lead to improved performance related to sexual
assault in the U.S. military.
* © 2021. Adjunct professor of law, Cornell Law School; visiting scholar, Queen’s Law in Ontario. In 2018, Prof.
Cox retired from the U.S. Army after 22 years of military service. While in the military, Prof. Cox served as an
airborne infantry soldier, combat camera operator, airborne infantry officer, and for seven years as an Army judge
advocate. His combat deployments include Iraq from 2003-2004 as a combat camera operator and Afghanistan from
2013-2014 as an operational law advisor and then chief of international and operational law for Regional CommandEast. Prof. Cox also served as a military prosecutor, federal prosecutor, brigade judge advocate, administrative law
attorney, legal assistance attorney, and military magistrate while he was a judge advocate. As an Army judge
advocate, Prof. Cox completed the Special Victims Unit Investigations Course at the U.S. Army Military Police
School as well as the Intermediate Trial Advocacy Course and the Brigade Leader’s Course at the U.S. Army Judge
Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, among other professional certification courses.

Measuring the Effectiveness of the Proposal to Divest Military Commanders of
Disposition Authority for Sexual Assault Cases: A Comparative Quantitative Analysis
Initial Observations
As the Independent Review Commission (IRC) continues the assigned 90-day
assessment of the issue of sexual assault in the U.S. military,1 the topic of military justice
reform has returned to center stage in the American political landscape. Among the most
contentious debates that has come to the fore yet again is whether military commanders
should retain the authority to refer allegations of sexual assault to court-martial. Although
this suggested reform is characterized by critics as a “solution in search of a problem,”2 by
now this perennial high-profile target for avowed reformists has created a “dysfunctional
cycle” that has been attributed to a “lack of basic knowledge about the military justice
system.”3
One centerpiece in the campaign for reform is to paint a damning picture of sexual
assault in the military by crafting a convincing narrative that is founded on a statistical
analysis. However, basing qualitative policy reforms, such as “improving” the problem of
sexual assault in the military, primarily on statistical data carries a significant risk that the
changes may not achieve the desired effect since numerical data is often not particularly
revealing regarding the underlying causes of the particular quantitative conditions being
measured. Nonetheless, the quantitative data that is available to the public has become a
centerpiece of the widespread characterization of the dire state of the U.S. military justice
system and the resulting need for drastic reform.
As but one recent example, Senator Kirsten Gillibrand pointed out in a PBS
interview, “Not only are there 20,000 estimated sexual assaults each year, but the percentage
of cases that are going to trial is going down, and the percentage of cases ending in
1

See Deputy Sec’y Def. Memorandum, Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military
Structure and Membership (Mar. 23, 2021), https://media.defense.gov/2021/mar/24/2002607579/-1/1/0/independent-review-commission-on-sexual-assault-in-the-military-structure-and-membership.pdf.
2
Geoffrey S. Corn, Chris Jenks & Timothy C. MacDonnell, A Solution in Search of a Problem: The Dangerous
Invalidity of Divesting Military Commanders of Disposition Authority for Military Criminal Offenses, JUST
SECURITY (June 29, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/71111/introducing-an-open-letter-from-former-u-s-militarycommanders-judge-advocates-commander-authority-to-administer-the-ucmj.
3
Chris Jenks & Geoffrey S. Corn, The Military Justice “Improvement” Act of 2020, CAAFLOG 1 (July 15, 2020),
https://www.caaflog.org/home/profs-jenks-corn-caaflog-exclusive-re-mjia.

conviction is also going down.”4 This quantitative narrative was cited to support Gillibrand’s
assertion that the “epidemic of sexual assault” in the military “is getting much worse.” This
characterization by Senator Gillibrand is strikingly similar to an assertion presented in the
forum of public advocacy that the U.S. military is in the grips of an “epidemic of rape.”5
Setting aside the efficacy of statistics-based narratives for the moment, the matter of
whether the proposed reform would achieve the desired outcome is still a matter of debate.
As Professor Lesley Wexler recently observed, an enhanced empirical or theoretical focus on
jurisdictions that do not utilize a commander-centric model can help “make sure that the
reforms proposed both address the existing problems and don’t exacerbate them
unintentionally or create new ones altogether.”6 The chairperson of the IRC, Lynn
Rosenthal, has maintained that the Commission is committed to considering “major shifts
and big picture items” designed to “bring about evidence-based prevention and hold
offenders accountable.”7 However, a detailed quantitative study of jurisdictions that have
already divested commanders of the authority to refer sexual assault cases to trial should
accompany any purported evidence-based suggestion for a “major shift” in policy in order to
ensure that the “reform” is likely to have the desired effects.
This essay assesses the performance of several U.S. partners and allies in relation to
preventing and responding to sexual assault in the military. In doing so, the study is designed
to contribute to the endeavor of developing an enhanced empirical and theoretical focus on
jurisdictions that do not implement a commander-centric model of referring sexual assault
cases to court-martial. The intent is to inform judgments regarding whether the proposed
reform would actually be expected to address the existing problems and improve
performance if implemented by the U.S. military.
Sen. Gillibrand: Sexual Assault in Military an ‘Epidemic’ That’s Getting Worse, PBS NEWSHOUR (Mar. 24, 2021),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/sen-gillibrand-sexual-assault-in-military-an-epidemic-thats-getting-worse.
5
Press Release, Protect Our Defenders & Military Sexual Assault Survivors Announce Launch of 2020 Senate
Candidate Pledge to Help End Crisis of Military Sexual Assault, PROTECT OUR DEFENDERS (Oct. 8, 2020),
https://www.protectourdefenders.com/press-release-protect-our-defenders-military-sexual-assault-survivorsannounce-launch-of-2020-senate-candidate-pledge-to-help-end-crisis-of-military-sexual-assault.
6
Lesley Wexler, Military #MeToo Justice: Is a Change Going to Come?, VERDICT (Apr. 13, 2021),
https://verdict.justia.com/2021/04/13/military-metoo-justice-is-a-change-going-to-come.
7
C. Todd Lopez, Commission Begins 90-Day Look Into Sexual Assault in Military, DOD NEWS (Mar. 24, 2021),
https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2548632/commission-begins-90-day-look-into-sexualassault-in-military.
4
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While care must be taken to account for historical and cultural divergences when
comparing legal frameworks across jurisdictions, analyzing the performance of jurisdictions
that are similar in heritage to the United States but that do not permit commanders to refer
sexual assault cases to trial can provide valuable insight regarding whether the proposed
reform would achieve the desired effect. Because the U.S. military currently vests in
commanders the authority to refer all criminal cases to court-martial, there is no data from
which to draw to develop an assessment of the projected effectiveness of the suggested
reform. In the absence of conclusive evidence at home to support or refute the effectiveness
of the proposal, what lessons can be gleaned from abroad?
Developing the Factors by Which to Measure “Success”
To provide analytical structure to this question, this study draws on two salient
observations on the topic that can be attributed to Senator Gillibrand. To establish the
selection of jurisdictions to consult, a page on Gillibrand’s current website that is dedicated
to the Military Justice Improvement Act notes that representatives from four other
jurisdictions – Australia, the United Kingdom, Israel, and Canada – provided evidence
involving their own domestic military justice system to a Senate hearing in 2013.8 These four
jurisdictions, then, are selected as the comparison set for the present inquiry.
Next, to develop a desired endstate, this study returns to Gillibrand’s recent PBS
interview for a particularly comprehensive articulation of what she hopes to achieve by
pursuing this reform. During the interview, Senator Gillibrand asserted that if the “decision
whether or not to go to trial in a given case [is] given to a trained military prosecutor who's
outside of the chain of command of the victim and the accused”:9
Then survivors would know that there was someone who would look at their case who
has no skin in the game, who has no bias, who doesn't know them or the accused, who
8

Kirsten Gillibrand, Military Justice Improvement Act: Comprehensive Resource Center for the Military Justice
Improvement Act, https://www.gillibrand.senate.gov/mjia (last visited May 21, 2021).
9
PBS NEWSHOUR, supra note 4.
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will give them a fair shake. It will mean more survivors come forward. And it will also
mean that, because of that professionalism, perhaps different cases are chosen and
there's a better end result.
Based on separate comments during the PBS interview, during which Senator Gillibrand
asserts that “unfortunately, the problem is getting much worse” given that there are “20,000
estimated sexual assaults each year,” it is reasonable to incorporate an expectation of reduced
incidence of sexual assault in the military to the list of desired outcomes as well.
With this vision in mind for what it would look like to, in Senator Gillibrand’s words
during the interview, “fix this problem,” it would be reasonable to expect that the
jurisdictions to which Gillibrand’s website refers – Australia, the United Kingdom, Israel and
Canada – demonstrate acceptable performance in the categories of desired improved
outcomes. This would support the conclusion that the United States could expect similar
progress if it were to follow suit and “professionalize how the armed services handle[s]”
sexual assault cases. That is, if “fixing” the problem means reduced incidence of reports of
sexual assault, more victims coming forward, different cases being chosen, and a better end
result for sexual assault cases (given remarks from earlier in the interview, presumably
“better” in this context means higher conviction rates), observing these outcomes in the
comparison set would constitute very strong evidence indeed in support of the proposal.
Unfortunately for reformists, a comparative analysis reveals quite the opposite in
relation to all of the categories of desired improved outcomes. In fact, an assessment of the
current state of each of the four jurisdictions selected for the present inquiry demonstrates
that there is no correlation at all – let alone indications of a causal relationship – between the
proposed reform and improved outcomes involving sexual assault cases. The absence of at
least a correlative relationship suggests that the proposed reform is unlikely to be effective in
achieving the desired outcomes and that different measures may be called for.
Although a full description of all potential comparative factors is beyond the scope of
this study, an overview of the relevant aspects of the military justice structures of each of the
four identified jurisdictions is sufficient for the present purpose of demonstrating the lack of
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a correlative relationship between the proposed reform and the desired outcomes. After
briefly introducing the military justice system in each jurisdiction, the analysis in the next
section presents a snapshot of current discourse involving sexual assault in the military for
each. Following the comparative analysis in the next section, this study concludes with some
reflections on the forthcoming report of the Independent Review Commission.
Brief Introduction and Overview of Current Relevant Discourse in the Four Selected
Jurisdictions
Australia
The military justice system in Australia is centered on the Defence Force Discipline
Act of 1982, the present compilation of which (No. 33) is current as of March 2, 2019.10
While the Australian MJ system does permit military commanders to refer certain cases to
court-martial, commanders may not do so in the case of a “prescribed offence.” These
include some specified offenses such as treason, murder, and manslaughter,11 while the
Defense Force Discipline Regulations further define prescribed offences as a service offence
that is punishable by imprisonment for more than two years.12
For any prescribed offence, a commander or military law enforcement agency may
refer a file to the Director of Military Prosecutions (DMP), and the DMP determines
whether to initiate a court-martial. Likewise, if an agency of the Joint Military Police Unit
(JMPU) determines that a case involving prescribed offences should not go forward, the
JMPU agrees to refer the file to the Office of the DMP (ODMP) “for consideration as to
the appropriate course of action to be taken.”13 According to § 63 of the DFDA, the
(civilian) Director of Public Prosecutions must provide consent before the ODMP may

10

See Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth), https://www.legislation.gov.au/details/c2019c00107.
Defence Force Discipline Regulations 2018 (Cth) § 104 https://www.legislation.gov.au/details/f2018l00265
12
Id., § 51 (this section of the DFDA includes a few exceptions to the definition of prescribed offenses that are not
relevant to the present discussion).
13
Director of Military Prosecutions, Report for the Period 01 January to 31 December 2019 (3 April 2020), para 37,
https://www.defence.gov.au/mjs/docs/2019-dmp-annual-report.pdf.
11
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initiate a prosecution for “certain serious offences, such as murder and aggravated sexual
assault offences.”14
Although the ODMP commenced operations in July 2003,15 the Defence Legislation
Amendment Act of 2006 consolidated the previous system of convening authorities and
conferred the role of primary convening authority to the DMP.16 Because the ODMP refers
prescribed offences to court-martial, then, military commanders do not have charging
authority in relation to allegations of serious sexual misconduct. Since data involving the
annual number of allegations of sexual misconduct is not available from before 2006 when
the ODMP assumed primary consolidated convening authority for prescribed offences, a
simple comparison of pre-reform and post-reform statistics is not possible. However, a
statistical analysis of several key data points is useful in the endeavor to assess whether
moving primary charging authority from commanders to the DMP enhanced the
performance of the Australian military justice system in relation to the categories of
outcomes reformists in the United States hope to improve by following suit.
The first point of interest is to note that there is no statistical correlation between the
reform and the numbers of reports of “unacceptable behavior” that were submitted during
the relevant time period. This metric, unacceptable behavior, which includes sexual offenses
among other similar categories of misconduct, is the only quantifiable data set that spans the
pre-reform and post-reform period. Starting with the period of 2001-2002 and continuing
through the period of 2010-11, the total number of reports of unacceptable behavior per
year are: 331, 451, 586, 749, 685, 846, 765, 873, 719, and 720 (these figures are drawn from
three consolidated reports, the Defence Annual Reports of 2004-05,17 2008-09,18 and 20101119). The fifth entry in this data set of ten annual figures, 685, corresponds with the year
DMP assumed primary consolidated convening authority for the Australian Defence Force.
14

Id. para. 54.
Department of Defence, Annual Report 2004-05 (4 November 2005), 125,
https://www.defence.gov.au/annualreports/04-05/downloads/0405_dar_10_full.pdf.
16
See Defence Legislation Amendment Act 2006 (Cth), https://www.legislation.gov.au/details/c2006a00159.
17
Department of Defence, supra note 15 at 121.
18
Department of Defence, Annual Report 2008-09, Vol. 1, cover 2 (Table, Key Defence Statistics),
https://www.defence.gov.au/AnnualReports/08-09/2008-2009_Defence_DAR_01_v1prelim.
19
Department of Defence, Annual Report 2010-11, Vol. 1 at 265 (Figure A5.3),
https://www.defence.gov.au/AnnualReports/10-11/dar_1011_v1_full.pdf.
15
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If a measure of performance for the military justice system is that the number of
reports of unacceptable behavior will decline, these statistics indicate that there is not a
correlation between the reform and this measure of performance. Although “unacceptable
behavior” in this context is not limited only to sexual offenses, the perceived performance of
the ADF involving certain “aspects of military and organisational culture,” including “in
relation to sexual and other abuse,” prompted a series of comprehensive reviews beginning
in 201120 (the end of the above data set). If satisfactory progress had been made from 2006
to 2011, it would be reasonable to assume that “sexual and other abuse” would not have
been an “aspect of military and organisational culture” that needed to be reviewed.
A second point of interest related to ADF statistical reports is that the number of
reports of sexual assault incidents has not appreciably declined in the period ranging from
2012-13 to 2019-20. While this range does not date back to 2006 when DMP took over
primary convening authority for courts-martial, it is again reasonable to assume that pre2012 statistical measurements were deemed to be unacceptable at least as late as 2011 when
the wave of comprehensive reviews related to military and organizational culture was
directed. The benefit of the data set reflected in the table below, which is drawn from the
2019-20 installment of the Annual Defence report,21 is that the statistics present the
numbers of reported sexual assaults per reporting period rather than reports of
“unacceptable behavior” more generally.
Although the figures from 2016-17 and before cannot be compared directly with the
figures from 2017-18 and later since “different reporting frameworks” were adopted starting
in 2017, this data set presents no indication that the number of reported sexual assault
incidents per year has declined appreciably since at least 2012:

20

See Department of Defence, Annual Report 2010-11, Part 1 at 4, https://www.defence.gov.au/annualreports/1112/dar_1112_full.pdf.
21
Department of Defence, Annual Report 2019-20 (21 September 2020), 143,
https://www.defence.gov.au/annualreports/19-20/dar_2019-20_complete.pdf.
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A third point of interest that emerges from examining the various reports that are
available to the public and that involve metrics of sexual assault in the ADF is that the
number of new incident management advice clients that are reported by the Sexual
Misconduct Prevention and Response Office (SeMPRO) has increased steadily since the
Office began operations in July 2013. The table below, which is drawn from the most recent
annual SeMPRO report, reveals that the average number of new incident management
advice clients referred to SeMPRO in the office’s first three years of operation was 116,
while the average number in the three most recent years is 251.30.22 This represents a more
than twofold increase in the average number of new incident management advice clients that
were referred to the Sexual Misconduct Prevention and Response Office in the most recent
three years as compared to its first three years of operations.

The final point of interest involving reports of sexual assault in the ADF to be
addressed here involves the prevalence of complainants in sexual offense allegations who
make the informed decision not to participate in investigative or prosecutorial efforts. In the
most recent report published by the Director of Military Prosecutions, the DMP explains in
detail the process and purpose of the dialogue in which the prosecution engages with the
complainant in a sexual assault allegation:23
Complainants in sexual offence allegations are advised of all their options, the
legislative protections provided for them, including giving evidence remotely,
restriction on cross examination and suppression of complainant’s identity and the fact
22

Sexual Misconduct Prevention and Response Office Annual Report FY 2019–20, 16,
https://www.defence.gov.au/sempro/_master/docs/sempro-annual-report-fy2019-20.pdf.
23
Director of Military Prosecutions, supra note 13, para. 42.
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that they can reverse their decision not to proceed with an allegation at a later date and
the implications that may bring. The intention is to ensure that a complainant’s
decision not to proceed any further with a complaint is not based on erroneous
assumptions or misunderstanding about the prosecution process.
Notwithstanding this detailed dialogue that is designed to ensure that complainants make an
informed decision whether to participate in the prosecutorial process, this most recent DMP
report indicates, “As in the previous reporting period, the overwhelming majority of [cases
referred to ODMP] were prescribed sexual offences,” and “in the majority of cases, the
complainant made the informed decision to take no further action once the complaint was
made, or there was insufficient credible evidence to proceed with the matter.”24 With the
above data related to the issue of sexual assault in the military in focus, what lessons can be
drawn regarding the intended outcomes if the suggestion to remove prosecution decisions
from military commanders were to be implemented in the United States?
If the overall number of reports of sexual offenses is any indication of the effectiveness
of the reform, the above analysis presents no correlative relationship to suggest that
implementing the reform would reduce the number of allegations of sexual assault made
each year. The connection between the sharp and steady rise of new incident advice clients
referred to SeMPRO each year and the observation by the DMP that a complainant makes
an informed decision not to proceed with the prosecution process is a factor “in the majority
of cases” indicates that there is no correlation to support the assertion that conferring courtmartial convening authority outside the chain of command “will mean more survivors come
forward” if the suggested reform were implemented in the United States. The other factor
that contributes to the DMP observation that an allegation does not progress “in the
majority of cases” – that “there was insufficient credible evidence to proceed with the
matter” – indicates that conferring convening authority to a prosecutor rather than a
commander will not mean “different cases are chosen and there's a better end result.”

24

Id, para. 38.
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In short, an analysis of the performance of the ADF military justice system presents no
correlative relationship to support the assertion that the suggested reform will “fix” the
problem of sexual assault in the military if the United States were to follow Australia’s lead.
The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom established an independent military prosecution service in
2006. For the UK, the revision was primarily in response to a string of successful challenges
filed with and adjudicated by the European Court of Human Rights. In the first such case,
Findlay v. United Kingdom (1997), the ECtHR found that the degree of authority exercised
by the accused’s commander violated the accused’s/complainant’s right to an independent
trial pursuant to Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights.25 After several
similar decisions by the ECtHR (such as Coyne (1997),26 Morris (2002),27 and Grieves (2003)28),
the UK finally established the independent Service Prosecuting Authority (SPA) with the
adoption of the Armed Forces Act of 2006.29
In the UK, the SPA “is the principal prosecuting authority within the Service Justice
System and is responsible for the prosecution of service offences before the Service
Courts.”30 The primary functions of the SPA are to decide “whether the case should be
prosecuted,” decide “where the case should be prosecuted,” determine “the appropriate
charges to bring,” and to prepare and present cases “in the Service courts – using either
employed advocates or members of the Bar.”31 As the SPA main website notes, the office “is

25

See Findlay v. United Kingdom, App. No. 22107/93 (Feb. 25, 1997),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-58016%22]}.
26
See Coyne v. United Kingdom, App. No. 25942/94 (Sep. 24, 1977),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-58097%22]}.
27
See Morris v. United Kingdom, App. No. 38784/97 (Feb. 26, 2002),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:[%22morris%20v.%20uk%22],%22documentcollectionid2%22:[%
22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-60170%22]}.
28
See Grieves v. United Kingdom, App. No. 57067/00 (Dec. 16, 2003),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22tabview%22:[%22document%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-61550%22]}.
29
See Armed Forces Act 2006, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/52/part/18/crossheading/serviceprosecuting-authority.
30
Ministry of Defence, Guidance: Service Prosecuting Authority, https://www.gov.uk/guidance/service-prosecutingauthority (Feb. 24, 2021).
31
Id.
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independent of both the Ministry of Defence and the military chain of command in respect
of its prosecutorial functions,” and it “acts under the general superintendence of the
Attorney General.”32
Although the breadth and depth of statistical reporting for the UK does not quite
match the Australian example, the nature of reporting adequately supports the endeavor of
the UK government to measure the performance of the military justice system. While the
most extensive and consistent statistical reporting dates back only to 2015, a number of
trends that are relevant to the present inquiry emerge from an assessment of a few key
metrics. The table below collects several data points from the 201733 and 202034 editions of
the annual report known as the Sexual Offences in the Service Justice System.
Since each annual report presents data from the current and preceding two years, an
analysis of these two reports permits coverage from 2015 to 2020. For the present inquiry,
the following data points related to allegations of sexual offenses are drawn from these two
reports: number of military personnel suspected of committing sexual offenses (Table 2 of
the reports), number of cases referred to the SPA for possible prosecution (Table 5 of the
reports), number of offenses with defendants heard at courts-martial (Table 6), and number
of guilty verdicts for these courts-martial (also Table 6). From 2015 to 2020, the numbers for
each data point in the set, as well as the percent of cases referred to the SPA that were heard
at court-martial and the percent of convictions for these cases at court-martial, are:

32

Id.
Ministry of Defence, Sexual Offences in The Service Justice System: 2017,
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/sexual-offences-in-the-service-justice-system-2017 (MS Excel
Spreadsheet) (Mar. 20, 2019).
34
Minisry of Defence, Sexual Offences in The Service Justice System: 2020,
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/sexual-offences-in-the-service-justice-system-2020 (MS Excel
Spreadsheet) (Mar. 25, 2021).
33
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2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

Total

Military suspects

88

116

138

160

188

150

840

Cases referred to SPA

99

130

86

123

157

152

747

Offenses with defendants

51

47

70

55

58

50

331

Guilty verdicts

21

21

26

21

16

29

134

Percent of referrals heard

51.5

36.2

81.4

44.7

36.9

32.9

44.3

41.1

44.7

37.1

38.1

27.6

58.0

40.5

heard at court-martial

at court-martial
Percent of convictions
from courts-martial
If these figures are compared to similar data drawn from reports published by the
U.S. military, an analytical comparison of the number of cases referred to court-martial and
the number of convictions at trial can be performed. Since military commanders rather than
an independent prosecutor refer cases to trial in the U.S. system, the number of alleged
sexual offenses for which the evidence supports a potential commander’s action (rather than
the SPA) takes the place of the second row above. Also, because statistics are compiled by
the U.S. military by fiscal year, which ends on September 30, the FY20 report is not yet
available.
The data in the top row in the table below is drawn from the U.S. 2019 Annual
Report on Sexual Assault in the Military (commonly referred to as a SAPRO Report) by
extrapolating the percentage of sexual offenses for which a service member is a suspect from
the total number of reported offenses for each year.35 The remaining figures are drawn from
a statistical study that collects the relevant data from the corresponding SAPRO Reports for
each year.36 The following table, then, presents for the U.S. military the data that is
equivalent to entries related to the UK military justice system reflected in the table above.
Dep’t Def., Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military, Fiscal Year 2019 (Apr. 17, 2020), Appendix B at 11
(Figure 4), https://www.sapr.mil/sites/default/files/3_appendix_b_statistical_data_on_sexual_assault.pdf.
36
David A. Schlueter & Lisa M. Schenck, National, Military, and College Reports on Prosecution of Sexual
Assaults and Victims’ Rights: Is the Military Actually Safer than Civilian Society?, 56 GONZ. L. R. 285, 331 (Table
32), https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1615&context=facarticles.
35
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2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

Total

Military suspects

3,621

3,489

3,884

4,470

4,616

--

20,080

Evidence supports

1,437

1,331

1,466

1,211

1,629

--

7,074

Cases tried at court-martial 543

389

406

307

363

--

2,008

Convictions

413

261

284

203

264

--

1,425

Percent supportable

37.8

29.2

27.7

25.4

22.2

--

28.4

76.1

67.1

70.1

66.1

72.7

--

70.1

commander’s action

offenses tried at courtmartial
Percent of convictions
from courts-martial
In total, the rate of cases tried at court-martial is 64.1% higher in the UK as
compared to the U.S., but the conviction rate for the cases that are tried by court-martial is
57.8% higher in the U.S. over this period as compared to the UK. Incidentally, the
percentage of cases initiated by military commanders in the US over this period is 55.9%,
which is slightly higher than the 44.3% of referrals to the SPA in the UK that are heard at
court-martial. The higher rate of initiation (55.9%) compared with the lower rate of cases
ultimately tried at court-martial in the U.S. (28.4%) indicates that a significant number of
cases (1,946 over five years) are determined by commanders not to be appropriate for courtmartial during the pre-trial process or are resolved prior to trial. For both jurisdictions, the
number of reports for which a service member is the subject has gradually increased over
this period of time.
While the rate of cases heard at court-martial is notably lower for the U.S. military,
the conviction rate for those cases that do go to trial is substantially higher in the U.S. system.
Likewise, the rate of cases for sexual offenses are initiated by U.S. commanders is noticeably
higher than the rate of cases ultimately sent to court-martial by the SPA in the UK. If the
figures from the UK present a useful comparison, the statistical analysis of similar U.S. and

13

UK numbers indicates that the U.S. is already performing in a similar or even preferrable
manner as compared to a military justice system that has conferred court-martial convening
authority to an independent Service Prosecution Authority since 2006.
Israel
The military justice system for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is similar to the UK in
that a military prosecutor is conferred with the sole authority to refer a case to court-martial
(to “draw up and file informations” in the vernacular of the Military Justice Law).37 When
current law professor and former IDF judge advocate Amos N. Guiora gave testimony to
the U.S. Senate in 2013, he observed that the “the Israeli system is profoundly different from
the current American system” primarily because of the “‘balance of power’ between the
commander and the Judge Advocate.”38 As a judge advocate, Guiora noted, he “was solely
entrusted with the decision to order the filing of an indictment against a soldier or officer”
and “the commander was granted no authority in the matter.”39
Although primary sources containing metrics such as those examined above for other
jurisdictions are not as widely available to the public (as far as I can tell), some relevant and
useful data is available from secondary sources. Regarding the overall number of sexual
assault complaints filed by military members, a report released last year observed that “in the
last decade there has been an average annual increase of 11 percent in reports.”40 According
to the same report, the number of complaints filed last year alone constitutes an “exceptional
increase in scope” compared to the previous year since the increase in 2020 was 24%
compared to 2019 – which is of course far higher than the average annual increase of 11%. 41
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§ 181(b), Military Justice Law, 5715—1955, SH 189 171, as amended,
http://www.knesset.gov.il/review/data/eng/law/kns2_militaryjustice_1_eng.pdf.
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Pending Legislation Regarding Sexual Assaults in the Military: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services,
130th Cong. 219 (2013) (statement of Amos N. Guiora), https://www.congress.gov/113/chrg/CHRG113shrg88639/CHRG-113shrg88639.pdf#page=223 [hereinafter Statement of Amos N. Guiora].
39
Id.
40
IDF Chief: ‘Zero Tolerance’ for Officer-Subordinate Relationships, THE TIMES OF ISRAEL (Feb. 25, 2021),
https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-chief-zero-tolerance-for-officer-subordinaterelationships/#:~:text=Israel%20Defense%20Forces%20Chief%20of,vowing%20to%20root%20them%20out.
41
Id.
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A similar report published in 2019 found that 1,706 complaints involving sexual offenses
were received from military members, while “just 165 cases were investigated by the relevant
military authorities.”42
This represents an investigation rate of 9.7%. The seemingly low rate of investigation is
consistent with a description of the findings of a similar report from 2018. According to the
description of these official findings, while “soldiers are more comfortable reporting sexual
assault, the report found there has been almost no increases in investigations by military
police into sexual assaults reported by soldiers and even a drop in cases opened by the
Military Advocate General’s Office.”43
Based on the overall number of complaints related to sexual offenses that are filed by
military members, then, the current trend in Israel is the same as in Australia and the UK: a
steady annual increase during the past several years. Notwithstanding this steady increase in
the number of complaints filed, the number of investigations initiated and cases prosecuted
appears to be trending in the opposite direction. This is the case even though, to return to
Guiroa’s reflection in 2013, “the Israeli system is profoundly different from the current
American system” in that judge advocates are “solely entrusted with the decision to order
the filing of an indictment against a soldier or officer.”44
Canada
For the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), the authority to send a criminal charge to
court-martial (that is, “prefer” charges in CAF vernacular) is vested solely with the Canadian
Military Prosecution Service (CMPS),45 for which the Director of Military Prosecutions
(DMP) is the head. The recommendation to establish this separate prosecution service was a
9 Out of 10 Rape Cases in Israel Closed Without Charges — Study, THE TIMES OF ISRAEL (Nov. 20, 2019),
https://www.timesofisrael.com/9-out-of-10-rape-cases-in-israel-closed-without-charges-study.
43
Anna Ahronheim, Dramatic Rise in Number of IDF Soldiers Reporting Sexual Assault, THE JERUSALEM POST
(Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/dramatic-rise-in-number-of-idf-soldiers-reporting-sexualassault-572369.
44
Statement of Amos N. Guiora, supra note 38 at 219.
45
Director of Military Prosecutions, Annual Report 2019-20 at 1 (23 June 2020),
https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/dnd-mdn/documents/legal-juridique/reports-rapports/dmp-dpm/dmp-ar-201920-en.pdf.
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central aspect of the 1997 Report of the Special Advisory Group on Military Justice.46 The
CMPS as well as the position of DMP have been operational since September 1999.
In 2015, an external review of the Canadian military justice system observed that
“very little data is collected by the CAF with respect to the occurrence of either sexual
harassment or sexual assault.”47 This review, which is widely referred to as the Deschamps
Report (after the external review authority, Marie Deschamps), further determined that “the
failure to keep data on complaints of sexual assault significantly weakens the accountability
of the chain of command.”48 Largely as a result of these findings, starting in 2016 there are
now more extensive and comprehensive statistical data available for study.
The first data point to be considered here appears at first glance to be encouraging if
a desired outcome is a reduction in the number of reported sexual assaults. During the threeyear period from FY 2016-17 to FY 2018-19, the number of sexual assault incidents reported
to the chain of command fell from 461 to 413 to 302.49 This constitutes a steady and rather
impressive decline of 65.5% over a three-year period.
However, when these figures are considered in light of statistics involving responses
to a biennial survey, the performance of the CAF related to the desired outcomes if the
United States were to divest commanders of court-martial referral authority appears rather
less encouraging. In the first such survey, which was administered externally by Statistics
Canada in 2016, a total of 960 CAF Regular Force members indicated that they had
experienced sexual assault during the 12 months before completing the survey.50 In the
second survey, which was administered by Stats Canada in 2018, that same figure fell a
meager 7%, to 900 total.51
46
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48
Id. at 72.
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In the first iteration of the Statistics Canada survey, the number of reports of sexual
assault received by the chain of command is 48.0% lower than the number of respondents
who indicated that they experienced sexual assault over a comparable period (461 reports to
the command compared to 960 affirmative survey responses). By the time of the second
survey, that percentage fell to 33.6% (302 reports to 900 affirmative survey responses).
These data points reveal that five years ago almost half of the Regular Force members who
indicated that they had been the victim of sexual assault declined to make a report, while
three years ago the rate of reporting fell from about half to only one third.
According to Senator Gillibrand’s performance criteria, this already low reporting rate
and the subsequent sharp decline would indicate a lack of trust in the reporting and
adjudication process in the CAF. This condition exists notwithstanding that statutory courtmartial preferral authority (“referral” in U.S. military vernacular) has been vested solely in the
Director of Military Prosecutions since 1998.52 When the rate at which allegations of sexual
assault that do get reported to the chain of command are preferred to court-martial (again, a
“preferral” in CAF terminology is a “referral” in U.S. vernacular), the apparent performance
in relation to the desired outcomes if the United States were to implement the suggested
reform is similarly unpromising.
In the three-year period from 2016-1753 to 2018-19,54 the number of sexual assault
offenses prosecuted at court-martial was 9, 9, and 6, respectively. As described above, the
number of reports of sexual assault of which the chain of command was notified during
these years was 461, 413, and 302. The rate of court-martial preferral for sexual assault
offenses as a function of the number of reports received by the chain of command each year
over this three-year period, then, is 2.0%, 2.2%, and 2.0%, respectively. By way of
comparison, the ratio of reports to court-martial referrals for the U.S. military during this
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17

period was 3,489:389; 3,884:406; and 4,470:307 (as described in the table above when
comparing the quantitative performance of the UK and the U.S.). These ratios equate to
11.1%, 10.5%, and 6.9%, respectively.
The three-year average of the ratio of the number of sexual assault notifications
provided to the chain of command to the number of sexual assault preferrals/referrals
during this period is 2.1% for the CAF and 9.5% for the U.S. military. This means the
average for the U.S. military, where commanders make the decision to refer charges to
court-martial, was more than 4.5 times higher than the average for the CAF during this
period. If a goal of the suggested reform is to increase the number of sexual assault
allegations that get referred to trial in the U.S. military, this comparison with the Canadian
Armed Forces – where the separate Directorate of Military Prosecutions makes all preferral
decisions – suggests that the U.S. military is already performing significantly better than the
CAF in relation to this particular measure of performance.
The Comparative Quantitative Analysis and the Independent Review Commission
Recommendations
The comparative quantitative analysis conducted in the present study does not bode
well for reformists such as Senator Kirsten Gillibrand who adamantly proclaim that
removing court-martial charging decisions from commanders will improve the issue of
sexual assault in the United States military. The military justice systems of several U.S.
partners or allies have long ago partially or completely removed charging authority from
commanders in favor of lawyers. Just like the United States, these partners and allies –
including Australia,55 the UK,56 Israel,57 and Canada58 – are still in search of effective
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solutions. The absence of a correlative relationship between the “reform” and the desired
outcomes in relation to the problem of sexual assault in the military for partners and allies
indicates that implementing the change in the United States will not achieve the intended
effects.
That is, if the experience of partners and allies is a useful gauge, there is no
quantifiable connection between removing charging authority from commanders and
improved systemic performance in relation to outcomes that have been identified by
reformists as indications of improvement in relation to sexual assault in the military. Of
course, just like any quantitative analysis of an inherently qualitative outcome such as
“improved” performance regarding sexual assault in the military, the efficiency of the
statistical evaluation conducted herein is limited to a certain degree. The endeavor of
drawing useful subjective appraisals from aggregated statistical data tends to obscure much
of the nuance that can best inform value judgements regarding systemic performance.
This obfuscation is even more prevalent when engaging in a comparative quantitative
analysis since measuring across systems is not particularly responsive to latent divergences in
history and culture that could contribute to differences in performance in the areas that are
measured. Inherent limitations notwithstanding, citing to quantitative data has become a
mainstay in the campaign to remove charging authority from military commanders. So, too,
has the tactic of asserting that the United States should follow the lead of partners and allies
that have already made the switch. If the case for “reform” is to continue to rest primarily on
inherently limited quantitative and comparative claims of improved performance, a
comparative quantitative analysis such as that conducted in this study can help inform the
judgments of lawmakers in the coming months as well as the perspectives of the constituents
they represent.
For now, all eyes will be on the report of the Independent Review Commission when
it is made public – and particularly on the “accountability” line of effort portion of the
report. Given that the IRC was tasked with a “90-day look into sexual assault in the
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military”59 and the accountability line of effort reportedly presented to Secretary Austin an
initial recommendation “that would take the responsibility of prosecuting sexual assault
offenses out of commanders' hands” after only six weeks,60 it is reasonable to question
whether the Commission conducted a comprehensive and impartial evaluation of the
available data before offering this recommendation. In the interests of full disclosure and
transparency, surely the IRC will publish a comprehensive accounting of all the evidence that
was presented to the Commission and that the Commission members considered when
forming the recommendations that will be presented in the final report.
As part of this accounting, it is of course reasonable to expect that the
recommendations from the accountability line of effort will present convincing evidence that
the suggested “reform” will bring about improved systemic performance in the U.S. military.
No doubt this convincing evidence will explain why the United States military can expect
improved performance in relation to the issue of sexual assault in the military
notwithstanding that a comparative quantitative analysis indicates that there is no correlative
relationship between removing charging authority from military commanders and the
improved outcomes reformists seek to foster. In the absence of a comprehensive accounting
of all evidence considered and of convincing proof demonstrating that the result will be
different in the U.S. military than the experiences of partners and allies that have made the
switch, lawmakers and their constituents will need to consider the IRC recommendations
with a considerable degree of skepticism.
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